Abstract-In this paper, an industrial testbed is proposed utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf equipment, and it is used to study the weakness of industrial Ethernet, i.e., PROFINET. The investigation is based on observation of the principles of operation of PROFINET and the functionality of industrial control systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE term Industrial Control System (ICS) refers to control systems deployed in critical infrastructure and several sectors of an industrial environment for monitoring and control of automated systems. ICSs are responsible for acquisition of analog or digital signals at each level of an industrial process, communication of these signals between automated devices at the same or higher levels, and for interpreting and representing them in human-readable form. In addition to this, an ICS controls and issues commands to industrial devices based on current values of the monitoring parameters. Once installed and implemented successfully, an ICS acts autonomously.
Some typical applications of ICSs include electricity generation plants, the chemical and oil industry, water and waste water management, nuclear power stations, and the manufacturing industry (e.g., automotive, integrated circuits). Moreover, ICSs are deployed throughout the transportation industry, such as for management of traffic in train systems, management of traffic lights, and even in management of prison security. We also find examples of ICSs inside commercial or military ships and aircraft.
As previously noted, the operation of an ICS is complex, supporting the interaction of several subsystems and devices. The ICS, from a theoretical point of view, consists of the controlled process, controllers, sensors, actuators, and humanmachine interfaces or engineering stations [1] . The controlled process is the entire infrastructure, and the design of the related ICS is tailored to serve the needs of the industry in which it operates (e.g., manufacturing, transportation management, energy production).
The operation of an ICS is based on several control loops [1] . These loops use signals that are generated by sensors, controllers, actuators, and human operators to perform dynamic adjustments to the whole process. Sensors are devices that generate signals in a digital or analog form; they are responsible for converting physical, chemical, or mechanical properties to electrical signals. Sensors are considered producer devices that actively generate signals. After processing, these signals can be used by other devices and can be transmitted to remote stations for further processing. Ultimately, these signals are converted to a human readable form.
The components making up an ICS system are as follows: Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Human Machine Interface (HMI), supervisory management workstations, data historians, and business information consoles [2] .
It is important to understand the dependency and connectivity of components that constitute the ICS. Any disruption in one component's operation can affect the overall ICS performance, security, and safety. To evaluate the security of the ICS, we reverse engineer PROFINET and setup a testbed for analysis.
The paper consists of three sections. Section II provides the ICS testbed. Afterward, we conclude in Section III.
II. INDUSTRIAL TESTBED IMPLEMENTATION
Apart from understanding the details of communication protocols and related security issues such as the lack of any mechanism embedded within the communication protocols themselves that protects their confidentiality, integrity, and availability, we considered that engagement and practice with actual industrial equipment would give better insight. We describe the equipment that we utilized for building a testbed as well as the programming we performed for enabling the full functionality and communication between the automation devices. Moreover, we present a series of useful observations that we made after programming the industrial devices and testing some publicly available exploitation tools. Finally, we perform a reconnaissance against the internal hardware architecture of an industrial controller that was part of our testbed.
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A. Testbed Setup
As emphasized so far, engagement with actual industrial equipment is required to observe the operation of industrial devices and communication protocols and detect security flaws or vulnerabilities if present. There was no particular reason for selecting Siemens equipment for setting up the testbed. We could have easily set up a similar environment using Allen Bradley/Rockwell industrial automation equipment.
The testbed includes two of the most recently developed industrial controllers, an HMI screen, and an industrial switch. To make the testbed more realistic, the devices were programmed to simulate a small monitoring and control application. In this way, we set up the devices as they were intended to operate and, therefore, could attempt to disrupt their operation.
The industrial process was built utilizing software provided by Siemens and known as the TIA Portal. The TIA Portal is a multipurpose platform which allows the user to program the programmable controllers and other peripheral devices. It allows fully functional simulation and emulation of the programmed industrial environment. In this way, the user can validate the correct operation of his/her design before actually downloading to the devices. TIA Portal allows the user to access the devices on-line while they are under operation. The advantage of this feature is that we can dynamically change some parameters of the programmable logic controllers. It also allows the user to access the diagnostics functionality embedded in the devices in real time. This is a very important functionality, as it enables a user to see any errors that occur during run time and examine the on-board memory utilization of the PLCs. In addition, we can see the bus cycle diagnostics. As mentioned earlier, the bus cycle is the total time required to provide all nodes with new set points and read the current values from all nodes in the same network segment. All these diagnostics are used later to examine whether our fuzzing operations, or other types of attacks affect the PLCs, the resources, or other peripheral devices.
The TIA Portal supports several programming languages for PLC controllers. For simplicity, we developed the monitoring and control operation using the LAD programming language. The LAD programming language is a graphical language, and the basic principle of this programming language imitates the behavior of electromechanical relay contacts that were heavily utilized in early automation designs. In other words, in LAD, we expect to see simple designs with electrical relay contacts that indicate the presence or the absence of a Boolean logic value in one of the digital input modules. LAD is also enhanced with some advanced features. These are function blocks which, when enabled by a digital signal, can perform more complicated tasks. Some of these tasks are implementing timers, counters, comparators, mathematic functions, move operations of memory segments, or signal conversions.
For Siemens equipment, one of the most fundamental concepts in PLC programming is Organization Blocks (OB). The OBs are independent entities of instructions that are executed by the PLC processor either on a cyclic basis or when triggered by certain events. Examples of such events might be the startup of the PLC, a hardware or software interrupt or an error. The OBs are very similar to system calls of the Unix operating system or function calls in the C programming language. The OB that is always present in any Siemens PLC program is OB1. This is a block similar to the main function we can find in any C program; there is, however, a fundamental difference. The OB1 is always executed cyclically, while the main function in a C program might be executed only once. The OB1 is also responsible for calling other organization blocks or other function blocks. The reason that OB1 is executed cyclically is that all values of the signals applied in the General Purpose Input-Output (GPIO) of the PLC must always be updated. During cyclic execution, the OB1 always validates and checks the status of the inputs, outputs, or assigned memory areas, or makes function calls defined by the user. The cycle time that was mentioned earlier for Siemens equipment corresponds to the time required for one complete execution of OB1. Any sufficiently large deviation from preconfigured time margins generates an alarm and is considered a high importance event that it is logged.
An example of LAD networks is illustrated in Figure 1 , an OR Boolean logic function. In these figures, the symbols of open contacts correspond to digital inputs at the input ports of the programmable logic controller. If a high input voltage is applied to the input of the PLC, then the open contact is converted to a closed contact, and the high-level signal is transferred to the output indicated by %Q0.6 (i.e., absolute addressing) or "Tag_14" (i.e., symbolic addressing). This LAD network can be placed either inside the OB1 or in function blocks specified by the user, which are called from the OB1.
Monitoring and control is the underlying purpose of any ICS; thus, we decided to create the monitoring and control system of a hypothetical diesel-engine-driven electric generator. We combined blocks created by the LAD language with other programming utilities. In addition, some auxiliary machineries needed for the generator were incorporated as well. The TIA Portal provided the required features to graphically represent our design. We created or drew graphical objects and associated these with the signals and parameters. In addition, we created action buttons; for example, we can create a button to start or stop a machinery process. After the design is finished, we downloaded the configuration into the PLCs and HMI screen, creating the simulation platform for our security testing testbed.
The designed environment for the monitoring and control of the hypothetical generator is illustrated in Figure 2 ; we see that the diesel generator is surrounded by some auxiliary pumps, a lubrication oil pump, and a coolant water pump for cooling water circulation. We also see the heat exchangers for the closed circuits of the lubrication oil and a coolant water. The "start" and "stop" buttons are used to start and stop the electrically driven pumps or the diesel generator. The boxes with the pound symbols indicate parameters like temperatures. These indications are derived hypothetically from analog sensors, whose analog signals are converted into digital values. The digital values are scaled so they properly represent the monitored parameter. The red circles in Figure 2 correspond to objects that indicate the status of the machinery. The color red indicates the machinery is not operational, while a green color indicates the machinery is in "running" status. Besides designing and building the industrial network, it is important to establish the communication channels between devices within the network. Communication between devices is driven by the operational needs of the system. Once communication is established, we can observe and evaluate the underlying protocols that are employed. The topology of our small-scale industrial network is shown in Figure 3 ; it consists of one HMI and two PLCs. Communication between the devices is dictated by the requirements of the equipment and parameters that need to be monitored. The following points describe the specification: a) PLC 1 is responsible for monitoring the operation of the diesel generator and cyclically updates the monitored parameters; b) PLC 2 is responsible for monitoring the fuel replenishment and supply system and sending to PLC 1 the status of the fuel valves and the operating status of the electrically driven fuel pump; and c) HMI 1 establishes communication with PLC 1 and PLC 2, so that the operator is continuously informed about the status of the machinery. HMI 1 is also capable of issuing commands to PLC 1 and PLC 2 so that the operator can remotely control the devices (e.g., starting/stopping the pumps and opening/closing the values). To observe and reverse engineer the communication protocols used by the industrial network, we use a passive Ethernet tap device. The tap is placed as a "bump in the wire" at every Ethernet cable that connects the devices in the industrial network.
The network topology of the industrial network is shown in Figure 4 . The programming unit represented by a laptop in the figure only connects to the network when the operator needs to program the industrial equipment or when the operator wants to access the online diagnostics provided by the PLC controllers and the HMI. The colors of the arrows indicate different types of traffic and protocols within the industrial network.
During the programming phase, we captured four different types of network traffic. Three of them were obtained when the LAD program is downloaded to the PLC controllers and HMI using the TIA Portal API. The fourth type is from a firmware update; specifically, it was captured during a firmware update of the CPU 1212C AC/DC/Rly. We captured packets for two reasons: a) observe the types of protocols used, and b) harvest information related to the hardware architecture and instruction set transferred or exchanged in the payload of the packets during the programming or firmware updates.
The following is a list of protocols observed: After the devices were programmed and configured, we observed the testbed in action and were able to monitor the small-scale industrial system using the HMI. In addition, the PLCs were observed using online diagnostics and emulations provided by the TIA Portal. The network traffic between the HMI and PLCs was captured and afterwards was analyzed. As mentioned previously, the HMI requires a continuous update of parameters such as temperature, pressure, and the status of the industrial devices. As shown in Figure 5 , the COTP data, which is encapsulated by TCP, is sent from the HMI to the PLCs via the network switch. The COTP data is used to provide commands to the PLCs.
Communications between two PLCs are synchronous, bidirectional and full duplex. We observed that the default data exchange between the PLCs uses the COTP protocol. To communicate, the devices use the GET and PUT functional blocks offered by the TIA Portal API.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose and setup a testbed to evaluate and reverse engineer the communications within the ICS. The testbed will be used for further cyber security analysis of an ICS system utilizing PROFINET.
